Posts Tagged ‘privacy’

moxie’s proxy

Sunday, January 22nd, 2012

Moxie Marlinspike, a security researcher probably best known for his SSL proxy tool, likes google even less than I do. His googlesharing website says:

“Google thrives where privacy does not. If you’re like most internet users, Google knows more about you than you might be comfortable with. Whether you were logged in to a Google account or not, they know everything you’ve ever searched for, what search results you clicked on, what news you read, and every place you’ve ever gotten directions to. Most of the time, thanks to things like Google Analytics, they even know which websites you visited that you didn’t reach through Google. If you use Gmail, they know the content of every email you’ve ever sent or received, whether you’ve deleted it or not.

They know who your friends are, where you live, where you work, and where you spend your free time. They know about your health, your love life, and your political leanings. These days they are even branching out into collecting your realtime GPS location and your DNS lookups. In short, not only do they know a lot about what you’re doing, they also have significant insight into what you’re thinking.”

His solution to this problem was interesting. He came up with the idea of a proxy system which would intercept all google queries, strip off identifying material (such as cookies and UserAgent strings and other HTTP headers) substitute new identifiers and mix the requests up with those from other users before forwarding to google. Implementation depended upon a Firefox addon (nothing for other browsers) which identified google queries and forwarded them to the proxy. All other traffic was untouched.

image of googlesharing proxy

I stopped using google (except via scoogle) some time ago, and when Moxie’s new proxy first surfaced I thought it interesting but susceptible to the same problem I discussed in mid 2009 when writing about Hal Roberts’ experience of GIFC – all you are doing is shifting knowledge of your searches from google to a new intermediary. However, Moxie later addressed this problem with the release of version 0.20 of his addon so I thought I’d take another look at it. Unfortunately the addon won’t work with FF 9 (which I am using). Moxie’s proxy is not the only one out there however. Because he released the code under an open source licence, others have picked it up. I found one at gs.netsend.nl. They also provide an updated FF addon which will work with versions up to 15 (i.e. probably around next wednesday given the speed with which Mozilla is currently shipping new FF releases).

Once the addon is installed, it gives you two proxy options in the preferences settings – one is the original proxy.googlesharing.net, the other is gs.netsend.nl itself. In testing I found that the original googlesharing proxy seemed to be off-line, but when using the netsend.nl proxy I was reassured to see the message “Search results anonymized by GoogleSharing” added to the google homepage. I was even more reassured that my sniffer showed a connection to vps1101.pcextreme.nl on 31.21.98.201 and not to any known google network.

So, will I use it? Maybe. But the proxy mechanism seems to be unreliable. In many tests, the proxy connection seemed to be bypassed and the connection was obviously made direct to google (as evidenced by my sniffer). I think this failure is doubly unfortunate because it does not fail safe (i.e. the connection does not simply fail with an error message, it passes you direct through to google). This could lead the unwary to think that they are protected when in fact they are not.

I prefer not to use google at all. And in those cases where I do want to compare results with another search engine I prefer to do so via tor. But it is one more option in my toolkit if used carefully. And if using it pisses off google, then it is worth it occasionally.

and darkness shall be upon the face of the net

Wednesday, January 18th, 2012

Today, 18 January 2012, parts of the ‘net went deliberately dark in combined opposition to the SOPA (A Bill to:“promote prosperity, creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation by combating the theft of U.S. property, and for other purposes.” I love the “other purposes” bit.) and PIPA bills currently being considered by the US legislative machinery. These two bills are classic examples of badly thought through legislation developed in response to lobby group pressure to protect an existing business model which is failing. I don’t normally make political comment, but I find myself entirely in agreement with the sentiments expressed on the torproject site this morning.

When first attempting to view the tor site, readers are faced with this:

image of blacked out tor website

Clicking on the blacked out section you are taken to a copy of the 18 January blog posting which says:

“The Tor Project doesn’t usually get involved with U.S. copyright debates. But SOPA and PIPA (the House’s “Stop Online Piracy Act” and the Senate’s “Protect-IP Act”) go beyond enforcement of copyright. These copyright bills would strain the infrastructure of the Internet, on which many free communications — anonymous or identified — depend. Originally, the bills proposed that so-called “rogue sites” should be blocked through the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). That would have broken DNSSEC security and shared U.S. censorship tactics with those of China’s “great firewall.”

Now, while we hear that DNS-blocking is off the table, the bills remain threatening to the network of intermediaries who carry online speech. Most critically to Tor, SOPA contained a provision forbidding “circumvention” of court-ordered blocking that was written broadly enough that it could apply to Tor — which helps its users to “circumvent” local-network censorship. Further, both bills broaden the reach of intermediary liability, to hold conduits and search engines liable for user-supplied infringement. The private rights of action and “safe harbors” could force or encourage providers to censor well beyond the current DMCA’s “notice and takedown” provision (of which Chilling Effects documents numerous burdens and abuses).”

Jimmy Wales, the founder of wikipedia has been a particularly vocal critic of the impending legislation. Today, english speaking users of wikipedia were greeted with the following page:

image of the wikipedia blackout page

There is plenty of discussion about the effects of SOPA and PIPA on-line in the usual technical fora (see wired, for example) but as El Reg said about a week ago, the mainstream media in the US have been largely quiet about the implications of the Bills should they ever become law.

I wonder why.

t-mobile resets its policy?

Thursday, January 12th, 2012

As I have mentioned in other posts here, I run my own mail server on one of my VMs. I do this for a variety of reasons, but the main one is that I like to control my own network destiny. Back in October last year I noticed an interesting change in my mail experience with my HTC mobile (actually my wife first noticed it and blamed me, assuming that I had “twiddled with something” as she put it). Heaven forfend.

My mail setup is postfix/dovecot with SASL authentication and TLS protecting the mail authentication exchange. My X509 certs are self generated (and so not signed by any CA). I pick up mail over IMAPS (when mobile) and POP3S (at home – for perverse reasons of history I like to actually download mail to my main desktop over POP3 and archive it to two separate NAS backups). I send via the standard SMTP port 25 but require authentication and protect the exchange with TLS.

My mail had been working fine ever since I set it up some years ago, but as I said, back in October my wife complained that she could no longer send email from her HTC mobile (we both use t-mobile as the network provider). She was at work at the time so away from my home network. Both our phones are setup to use use wifi for connectivity where it is available (as it is at home of course). When my wife complained I checked my phone and it could send and receive without problem. But when I switched wifi off, thus forcing the data connection though the mobile network, I got the same problem as my wife reported. On checking my mail server logs I read this:

postfix/smtpd[28089]: connect from unknown[149.254.186.120]
postfix/smtpd[28089]: warning: network_biopair_interop: error reading 11 bytes from the network: Connection reset by peer
postfix/smtpd[28089]: SSL_accept error from unknown[149.254.186.120]:-1
postfix/smtpd[28089]: lost connection after STARTTLS from unknown[149.254.186.120]
postfix/smtpd[28089]: disconnect from unknown[149.254.186.120]

(the ip address is one of t-mobile’s servers on their “TMUK-WBR-N2″ network)

Everything I could find about that sort of message suggested that the client was tearing down the connection because there was something wrong with the TLS handshake and it was not trusted. Checking earlier logs, I found that t-mobile’s address had apparently changed (to the address above) recently. So I assumed that some recent network change following the Orange/T-mobile merger had been badly managed and all would be well again as soon as the problem was spotted. Wrong. It persisted. So I had to investigate further. As part of my investigation of the error, I tried moving mail from port 25 to 587 (submission) because that sometimes gets around the problem of ISPs blocking, or otherwise interfering, with outbound connections from their networks to port 25, No deal. In fact it looked as if t-mobile were blocking all connections to port 587 (I assumed a whitelisting policy block, or again, a cockup).

So, the scenario was: mail works when connecting over wifi and using my domestic ISP’s network, but doesn’t when using t-mobile’s 3G network. Symptoms point to a lack of trust in the TLS handshake. Tentative conclusion? There is an SSL/TLS proxy somewhere in the mobile operator’s chain. That proxy sucessfully negotiates with our phones, but when it gets my self certified X509 cert from the server. it can’t authenticate it and decides that the connection is untrusted so tears it down. My server sees this as the client (my phone) tearing down the connection. [As it turns out, this conclusion was completely wrong, but hey].

I said in an email at the time to a friend whose advice I was seeking, “I suspect cockup rather than outright conspiracy, but if my telco is dumb enough to stick a MITM ssl proxy in my mail chain, they really ought to have thought about handling self signed certs a little better. Otherwise it sort of gives the game away.”

In response, he very sensibly suggested that I should run a sniffer on the server and check what was going on. At that time, I was busy doing something else so I didn’t. And because the problem was intermittent (and my wife stopped complaining) I never got around to properly investigating further. (I should explain that I rarely send mail from my mobile nowadays. I just read mail there and wait until I get home to a decent keyboard and can reply to whatever needs handling from there. My wife just gave up bothering to try).

I should have persisted because of course I wasn’t the only one to experience this problem.

Back in November, a member of the t-mobile discussion forum called “dpg” posted a message complaining that he could not connect to port 587 over t-mobile’s 3G network. In response, a member of the t-mobile forum team suggested that dpg might reconfigure his email so that it was relayed via t-mobile’s own SMTP server. Not unreasonably, dpg didn’t think this was an acceptable response – not least because he would then have to send his email in clear. He then posted again saying that “the TLS handshake fails when the mail client receives a TCP packet with the reset (RST) flag set.” (This is a bad thing (TM). Further, he posted again saying that he had set up his own mail server and repeated earlier tests so that he could see both ends of the connection. At the client side he posted mail from his laptop tethered to his phone which was connected to the t-mobile 3G network. By running sniffers at both ends of the connection he was able to prove to his own satisfaction that something in the t-mobile network was sending a RST and tearing down any connection when a STARTTLS was seen. Again, in a later post in response to one from another poster who apparently manages several mail servers and had been looking at the same issue for a client, dpg says:

“I must say I’m not too pleased to discover that T-Mobile may be snooping all traffic to check for SMTP messages. I have demonstrated that they may be doing this by running a SMTP server on a non-standard port and finding that they still sent TCP reset packets during TLS negotiation – so they must be examining all packets and not just those destined for TCP ports 25 and 587.

I’m also not that keen on T-Mobile spoofing/forging TCP resets. This is the sort of tactic resorted to by the Great Firewall of China (http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/06/27/ignoring-the-great-firewall-of-china/) and also by Comcast back in 2007 (https://www.eff.org/wp/packet-forgery-isps-report-comcast-affair) until the US FCC told them to stop (http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf).”

Then 9 days ago, dpg posted this message:

“I finally got to the bottom of this. I was contacted by T-Mobile technical support today and was told that they are now actively looking for and blocking any TLS-secured SMTP sessions. So, it is a deliberate policy after all, despite what the support staff have been saying on here, twitter and on 150. They told me it is something they have been rolling out over the last three months – which explains why it was intermittent and dependent on IP address and APN to begin with.

So, the only options for sending email over T-Mobile’s network are:
- unencrypted but authenticated SMTP (usually on port 25)
- SSL-encrypted SMTP (usually on port 465)
- unauthenticated and unencrypted email to smtp.t-email.co.uk

TLS-encrypted SMTP sessions are always blocked whether or not they are on the default port of 587.”

(As an aside, there is, of course, another alternative. You can ditch t-mobile as your provider and pick one which doesn’t use DPI to screw your connections. You pays your money….)

Following this, a new poster called “mickeyc” said this:

“I’ve been experiencing this exact same problem. I run my own mail server which has SSL on port 465 and also uses TLS on port 587. I used wireshark to confirm that the RST packets are being spoofed. This is the exact same technology used by “The Great Firewall of China”. I have two t-mobile sims. One is about a year old and doesn’t experience this problem (yet), one is a few weeks old and does.”

He went to say that he had also experienced problems with his OpenVPN connections and would be blogging about the problem (damned bloggers get everywhere) and sure enough, Mike Cardwell did so at grepular.com. That blog post is worth reading because it has an interesting set of comments and responses from Mike appended.

Mike’s post seems to have been picked up by a few others (El Reg has one, and as Mike himself has pointed out, boingboing.net has a particularly OTT post which seems to say that he is accusing t-mobile of something he clearly isn’t.

Finally, two days ago, dpg posted this:

“I’m pleased to report that T-Mobile is no longer blocking TLS-secured email on port 587. As a follow-up to an email exchange over the Christmas period I was contacted today to say that, contrary to what I had been told previously, it was never a deliberate policy to block TLS-secured outgoing email. There was a problem with some equipment after all, which was resolved yesterday.”

I tried again myself today. Initially, I got the same old symptoms (“lost connection after STARTTLS”) then I rebooted my ‘phone and lo and behold I could send email.

Like Mike, I tend to the cockup over conspiracy theory, it’s more likely for one thing. IANAL, but it seems to me that it would be in breach of RIPA part I, Unlawful Interception, for the telco to intercept my SMTP traffic in the way it seems to have been doing. That is not likely to be a deliberate act by a major UK mobile network provider.

But I’ll still keep an eye on things.

tails in a spin

Thursday, January 12th, 2012

When I first tested running a tails mirror on one of my VMs, the traffic level reported by vnstat ran at around 20-30 GiB per day. I figured I could live with that because it meant that my total monthly traffic would be unlikely to exceed my monthly 1TB allowance. However, when I checked the stats on that server last week (around the 9th of Jan) I found that I was shipping out around 150 GiB per day and vnstat was predicting a monthly total of close to 3 TB. As the tails admins said when I told them that I would have to shut off the mirror on that VM while I sorted something, “Ooops”. Ooops indeed. I couldn’t chance a massive bill for exceeding my bandwidth allowance by quite that much. The actual stats for 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 January before I pulled the plug were: 34.23 GiB, 69.14 GiB, 178.31 GiB, 131.68 GiB, 99.05 GiB and 133.27 Gib. It turns out that tails 0.10 was released on 4 January and I hadn’t been prepared. A lesson learned.

Having shut down and had the DNS round robin amended, I attended to finding some way of throttling my traffic so that I could live within my allowance whilst still providing a useful mirror. I scratched my head for a while before stumbling on the obvious, I should be throttling at application level. (Sometimes I find that I miss simple answers because I am looking for complicated ones).

I started out by assuming that I should be using tc and iptables mangling, or something like the userspace tool trickle, all of which looked horribly more complicated than the approach taken by tor (which allows you to simply set the acceptable bandwidth rate to some limit, plus set an accounting period maximum of some total transfer limit per day/week whatever). And of course it turns out that my webserver (lighttpd) allows something similar. Just set the server limit to some chosen max transfer rate and, if necessary, also impose a per IP max rate. The magic configuration file options are:

# limit server throughput to 3000 kbytes/sec (~30000 kbits/sec)
server.kbytes-per-second = 3000
#
# and limit individual connections to 50 kbytes (~500 kbits/sec) – NB. I don’t actually use this
# connection.kbytes-per-second = 50

I tested this by pulling a copy of the tails iso from one of my other VMs which has a high bandwidth connection and got acceptable (and expected) results. So now I can go back on-line later this month safe in the knowledge that I’m not going to blow all my bandwidth in one week.

the amnesic incognito live system

Tuesday, December 20th, 2011

Or “tails” if you prefer, is a live CD/USB distribution based on debian which aims to help you preserve your privacy and anonymity when out and about. As the home website says, tails helps you to:

  • use the Internet anonymously almost anywhere you go and on any computer:
    all connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor network;
  • leave no trace on the computer you’re using unless you ask it explicitly;
  • use state-of-the-art cryptographic tools to encrypt your files, email and instant messaging.

This is a good thing (TM).

I already have a system at home which allows me to use the tor network whenever I want to be anonymous, but tails allows me to do the same thing when I’m away from that setup. I like the idea so much that I now provide a mirror for the tails distribution to complement my tor exit node. Every little helps.

no you can’t have my mobile number

Wednesday, November 23rd, 2011

I guess, like me, many parents will have facebook accounts simply as a means of communicating with their kids. In the past I have used my account as a way of finding out what my kids actually do, or like in the way of music for example. This can be more fruitful than attempting a conversation with a grumpy teenager. My kids are no longer teenagers so I don’t use it much these days. However I tried today to check my son’s page in the hope that it might give me some inspiration for a christmas present. Facebook won’t let me log on unless I give it a mobile phone number.

image of facebook login page

No Zuckerberg, you cannot have my mobile number. And I am seriously pissed off that I cannot now even get to my account to delete it.

google buys advertising

Wednesday, November 23rd, 2011

In an interesting reverse of the norm, google paid for three full page adverts in the guardian a couple of days ago. Today there is yet another full page ad in the same paper. I assume they have run similar campaigns in other UK newspapers over the past few days, The ads are quite intriguing in that they seem to be addressing potential concerns about the use of well established web technologies. Today’s ad, for example, was about cookies. Each ad points to a google site giving further detail.

These adverts cannot have been cheap. What are they worried about?

I have a policy

Tuesday, October 11th, 2011

As I have said in many posts in the past, I care about my privacy. I also care about yours. Ironically however, I have not until now codified exactly what I mean by that, nor have I identified what I will or will not do to protect your privacy. This seems to me a little unfair.

So I have drafted a privacy policy for this blog.

Let me know what you think (and remember to lie where necessary)

irony is not dead

Tuesday, March 29th, 2011

Installing counterize to analyse trivia’s logs has been instructive. I now know that some of my most visited pages are consistently those of a “how-to” nature (in particular, those about postfix, dovecot and, strangely, reflashing the old BT home hub). In many ways this is satisfying since one of the objectives of this blog is to document solutions to problems I have encountered personally.

But counterize provides much more than this. For example, I now know that of my visitors, 46.09% use firefox, followed by 27.24% using IE, with safari trailing in third place on 8.75%. Further, the top browser by version is IE 6.0 (now there’s a surprise…) at 13.14% and the most used OS is windows XP at 42.65% (sad, but you can’t argue with the stats).

However, what really intrigues me is the referer analysis. Some are fairly obvious given the content viewed. For example one of the top referers is a page on the-scream.co.uk which points to my articles on the home hub. Others are less so. One that caught my eye today is a referer from a website which sells a tool to spy on mobile phones. That site has a privacy policy (!) which says the following:

Privacy Policy

This privacy policy applies to the use of http://www.spybubble.com

We highly value your privacy and make this policy easily available throughout our site to assist you in understanding the handling of information in the course of using this site.

As Terry Wogan would say, “is it me?”

click here

Sunday, January 23rd, 2011

The Cory Doctorow article referenced at the end of the post below mentions URL shorteners as potentially dangerous because they completely obscure the actual URL you will be taken to if you click them. By way of experiment I thought I’d post one here just to see how often it is used.